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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Criminal Code is to be construed to promote justice, 
and to effect the objects of the law. This Court has power to construe 
"and" to mean "or11, in the Utah custodial interference statute, in 
order to promote justice, and to clarify the application of the law. 
In this case, this Court should construe the word "and", 
between paragraphs (1) (a) and (1) (b) of Utah Code Annotated Section 
76-5-303, to mean "or", in order to harmonize and reconcile the provi-
sions of that statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUE "AND" TO MEAN 
"OR11 IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-2 provides that the statutes 
of the State of Utah are to be liberally construed, with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes, and to promote justice. This 
principle is expressly made applicable to the Utah Criminal Code by 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-106, as follows: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly 
construed shall not apply to this code, any of 
its provisions, or any offense defined by the 
laws of this state. All provisions of this code 
and offenses defined by the laws of this state 
shall be construed according to the fair import 
of their terms to promote justice and to effect 
the objects of the law and general purposes of 
Section 76-1-104. 
The general rule is that courts have the power to change, 
and will change, ffand" to "or", and vice-versa, whenever such conver-
sion is required by the context, or to save it from unconstitutionality, 
or, in general, to effectuate the obvious intention of the legislature. 
However, in penal statutes, the word "or" cannot be interpreted as 
meaning "and", when the effect would be to aggravate the offense 
or increase the punishment. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes, § 241, p. 420 
(1974), citing Smith v. Casper, 419 P. 2d 704 (Wyo. 1966). 
Numerous courts across the country have interpreted various 
statutes in accordance with that general rule. For example, in People 
v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P. 2d 752 (Cal. 1985), the Supreme 
Court of California held that the inadvertent use of the word "and", 
where the purpose or intent of the statute seems clearly to require 
the word "or", is an example of a drafting error which may properly Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be rectified by judicial construction. Similarly, in McMechan v. 
Everly Roofing,Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 8 Kan. App. 2d 
349, 656 P. 2d 797 (Kan. App. 1983), the Court of Appeals of Kansas 
held that the word "and" in a statute may be construed to mean "or", 
when it is necessary to carry out the legislative intent. For other 
such examples of statutory construction by various courts, see, e.g., 
Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 303 Md. 280, 
493 A. 2d 341 (Mdkl985); People v. Wang, 128 Misc. 2d 554, 490 N.Y.S. 
2d 423 (N.Y. Sup. 1985); State vs. Hughes, 702 S.W. 2d 864 (Mo. App. 
1985); and State v. Grimes, 292 S.C. 204, 355 S.E. 2d 538 (S.C. 1987). 
Thus, it is clear that, where necessary to promote justice, 
and to effect the objects of the law, this Court has the authority 
to construe "and" to mean "or" in the Utah custodial interference 
statute under consideration in this case. 
POINT II: THIS COURT SHOULD CONSTRUE "AND" TO MEAN "OR" IN THIS 
CASE, IN ORDER TO RECONCILE THE PROVISIONS OF THE CUSTODIAL INTER-
FERENCE STATUTE. 
In interpreting a statute, the Court should look to all 
of its parts, and should not rely too heavily on characterizations 
such as the "disjunctive" form versus the "conjunctive" form, in 
resolving difficult issues. Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F. 
2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986); cert.denied, 107 S. Ct. 1592-1593 (1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, in cases of apparent 
conflict between provisions of the same statute, it is the Court's 
duty to harmonize and reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court 
cannot presume that the legislature intended to create a conflict. 
Where contradictory provisions are passed, the provision susceptible 
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of but one meaning will control those susceptible of two, if the 
statute can thereby be rendered harmonious. Madsen v. Brown, 701 
P. 2d 1086 (Utah 1985) at 1089-90. 
In this case, a careful examination of the current Utah 
custodial interference statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-
303, reveals that paragraph (1) (a) of that section must be interpreted 
to operate independent of paragraphs (1) (b) and (2) of that section, 
particularly in light of the 1979 and 1984 amendments to that section. 
In 1979, the penalty for custodial interference was increased 
from a Class B Misdemeanor in all cases to a Class A Misdemeanor; 
and where, as in this case, the child is removed and taken from one 
state to another, the penalty was increased to a third-degree felony. 
In 1984, former subsection (3) was deleted, which dealt 
with the taking of incompetents, or other persons "committed by authority 
of law" to the custody of another person or institution, from such 
other person or institution, knowing he or she has no legal right 
to do so. 
In the process of enhancing the penalty for violation of 
Section 76-5-303 in 1979, and deleting the foregoing provision in 
1984, it is inconceivable that the legislature intended to deprive 
natural parents of any remedy for unlawful interference with their 
inherent parental rights to the custody of their own children, where 
no court order of custody is in effect. To read the statute as defendant 
and respondent urges, in a manner restricting its application to 
situations where custody has been ruled upon by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, renders meaningless the phrase "whether a parent or 
other" in paragraph (1). 
_ A _ 
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More importantly, the interpretation claimed by defendant 
and respondent would create a conflict with paragraph (2) of the 
statute, which the legislature surely did not intend. If paragraph 
(1) were to be restricted only to cases where there is an existing 
judicial order of custody, then paragraph (2) would appear to be 
inconsistent, because it does not require the element of "knowing 
the actor has no legal right to do so." It is readily apparent that 
paragraph (1) (b) is intended to address those cases where a non-
custodial parent holds a child for a period substantially longer 
than the period prescribed by court order, while paragraph (2) is 
intended to address the opposite situation of a custodial parent 
who holds a child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful 
visitation or custody rights. Paragraph (2) does not require the 
element of "knowing the actor has no legal right to do so"; yet 
it addresses precisely the converse of the conduct prescribed by 
paragraph (1) (b). It would seem to be an artificial and convoluted 
interpretation of this statute to require a culpable mental state 
for a non-custodial parent, but not to require the same for a custodial 
parent. 
In short, the only reasonable interpretation of this statute, 
which harmonizes and reconciles all of the foregoing provisions, 
is to construe paragraph (1) (a) to operate independent of paragraphs 
(1) (b) and (2). By construing the statute in that manner, paragraph 
(1) (a) would then protect the inherent custodial rights of natural 
parents, where, as here, there is no existing judicial order of custody; 
paragraph (1) (b) would address the situation where a non-custodial 
parent holds a child inviolation of an existing court order; and 
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paragraph (2) would address the circumstance where a custodial parent 
holds a child in violation of lawful visitation or custody rights. 
Such clarifying construction would neither aggravate the offense, 
nor increase the punishment for the offense, and would clearly promote 
justice in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
THE STATE OF UTAH respectfully requests that this Court 
hold that the word "and" between paragraphs (1) (a) and (1) (b) of 
Section 76-5-303 should be construed to mean "or", in order to harmonize 
and reconcile the provisions of the statute, promote justice, and 
effect the objects of the law; and in order to give recourse to the 
State of Utah in cases of unlawful interference with the inherent 
parental rights of natural parents to the custody of their own children, 
where there is no court order of custody in effect. THE STATE OF 
UTAH respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of 
the Circuit Court, vacate the Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered 
by that Court, and remand this case to the Circuit Court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 1988. 
Patrick B. Nolan 
Garfield County Attorney Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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